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Summary
Interruptions of congressional operations by incidents such as episodic computer
virus infections, or the anthrax contamination that took place during autumn 2001,
have demonstrated the importance of congressional continuity of operations (COOP)
planning.  COOP planning refers to the internal effort of an organization to assure
that the capability exists to continue essential functions in response to a
comprehensive array of potential operational interruptions.  For Congress, COOP
planning is related to a second level of preparedness, continuity of government
(COG) planning.  Congressional COG planning focuses on ensuring that Congress
is able to carry out its legislative responsibilities under Article I of the Constitution.
This report discusses the circumstances surrounding COOP planning, including
provisions for alternative meeting sites and methods for conducting House and
Senate meetings and floor sessions when Capitol facilities are not available.
Although this report does not discuss COG planning beyond its direct relationship
to COOP planning, a more comprehensive analysis of COG can be found in CRS
Report RS21089, Continuity of Government: Current Federal Arrangements and the
Future.
The task of ensuring that Congress can continue to carry out its constitutional
responsibilities in case of disruption, presents unique challenges in addition to the
operational concerns common to most organizations.  One challenge involves the
relocation of legislative activities.  There appears to be no constitutional bar to the
House and Senate adopting a resolution that approves meetings of either chamber
outside the Capitol in advance of doing so.  In addition, the rules of each chamber
allow for committee activity beyond Washington, DC.  However, concerns regarding
the availability of appropriate alternative facilities, communication and technical
capabilities, and providing the necessary physical security, have arisen.
Other concerns regarding physical security have prompted some observers to
propose creating a virtual or electronic Congress (e-Congress).  Although these
suggestions have generally focused on the creation of a Web site accessible by
Members anywhere in the country, it is unclear exactly how an e-Congress would be
constituted and operated.  Other challenges for COOP planning include maintaining
Member office information security, and the Legislative Information System (LIS).
Although current congressional COOP planning began prior to September 11,
2001, details surrounding House and Senate COOP planning are not publicly
available, and some specific information is excluded from this report to preserve
operational security.  Contingency planning in the House, however, has evolved over
the past 20 years and there exists a range of backup strategies for maintaining critical
House legislative and administrative information systems.  In the Senate, initial
COOP planning was completed in spring 2002, and continues to be refined.
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1Ian Hopper, “Destructive ‘ILOVEYOU’ Computer Virus Strikes Worldwide,” CNN.com,
May 4, 2000, [http://www.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/05/04/iloveyou/].
2A cyber attack is an incursion on a range of IT facilities, and can range from simply
penetrating a system and examining it for the challenge, thrill, or interest, to entering a
system for revenge, to steal information, cause embarrassment, extort money, cause
deliberate localized harm to computers, or damage to a much larger infrastructure, such as
telecommunications facilities.  See CRS Report RL30735, Cyberwarfare, by Steven A.
Hildreth.
Congressional Continuity of Operations
(COOP): An Overview of Concepts and
Challenges
Introduction
The autumn 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, and increasing dependence
of organizational functions on advanced information technology (IT), have brought
renewed attention to the need for organizations to engage in continuity of operations
(COOP) planning.  Recent interruptions of congressional operations through both
computer virus infections1 and terrorist attacks have demonstrated that these concerns
and needs extend to Congress, as well as to other private and public institutions.
Some private sector activities can be relocated or reconfigured to respond to
continuity threats by dispersing centralized facilities, installing automated backup
systems, or maintaining excess capacity.  The task of ensuring that the 540 Members
of Congress can continue to carry out their constitutional responsibilities in case of
disruption presents special and unique challenges in addition to the operational
concerns common to most organizations.  An attack against Congress could result in
a loss of individuals critical to governance, destroy important symbols of
government, and undermine the national sense of safety and security.
Continuity of operations planning refers to the internal effort of an organization,
such as an office or department, to assure that the capability exists to continue
essential functions in response to a comprehensive array of potential operational
interruptions.  COOP planning is an ongoing process that is driven in part by growth
and change of information systems, personnel, and mission critical needs.
Operational interruptions may include routine building renovation or maintenance;
mechanical failure of heating or other building systems; fire; inclement weather or
other acts of nature; or a range of threatened or actual attacks.  Other events which
may interrupt congressional activity include failure of information technology (IT)
and telecommunications installations due to malfunction or cyber attack.2  For
Congress, these interruptions might affect an individual office, building, or the entire
Capitol complex.  As the anthrax incidents in the Hart Senate Office Building
CRS-2
3Under the Presidential Succession Act (61 Stat. 380; 3 U.S.C. 19), the line of presidential
succession passes to the Speaker of the House and President pro tempore of the Senate, if
the President and Vice President are unable to carry out their duties.  Continuity of
government planning provides mechanisms to preserve the line of succession, but is not
considered in this report.  See CRS Report 98-731, Presidential and Vice Presidential
Succession, by Thomas H. Neale, and CRS Report RS21089, Continuity of Government:
Current Federal Arrangements and the Future, by Harold C. Relyea.  See CRS Report
RS21068, House Vacancies: Selected Proposals to Allow for Filling Them Due to National
Emergencies, by Sula P. Richardson, for a detailed analysis of recent proposals to fill
vacancies in the House of Representatives.
4Enterprise is often used in the computer industry to describe any large organizations,
including corporations, small businesses, nonprofit institutions, or government bodies, that
utilize computers.  In practice, the term is applied much more often to larger organizations
than smaller ones.  An intranet, an internal system of sharing data and software, is an
example of an enterprise computing system.
demonstrated, recovery from these incursions may not be immediate, and may require
the relocation of Members of Congress and congressional staff, infrastructure, and
operations for prolonged periods of time.
For Congress, COOP planning is related to a second level of preparedness,
continuity of government (COG) planning.  COG planning involves the ability of an
entire branch of government to carry out its functions.  Congressional continuity of
government planning focuses on ensuring that Congress is able to carry out its
legislative responsibilities under Article I of the Constitution.  In Congress, this can
include preserving the line of succession to the presidency, as well as establishing an
alternative meeting site for Congress.3  A third level of preparedness, enduring
constitutional government (ECG), which is not addressed in this report, involves
planning by the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government to
maintain the ability to assure the survival of the country’s constitutional,
representative form of government in the event of a catastrophic emergency.
COOP and COG plans can be activated independently.  Under most
circumstances a COOP plan could be activated when there is no COG threat.
However, many believe that to ensure the ability of the legislative branch to provide
essential services to citizens and carry out critical functions, integration of the two
types of planning is necessary to ensure the efforts developed under each plan will
work together seamlessly when necessary.
This report discusses the circumstances surrounding congressional continuity
of operations planning.  It also discusses the backup, maintenance, and portability of
various administrative functions used to support Congress, such as legislative
information, e-mail, and the continuity of congressional information technology (IT)
and enterprise systems.4  Plans and details surrounding COOP planning are not
publicly available, and some specific information is excluded from this report to
preserve operational security.  A glossary of COOP planning terms is included in the
appendix.  This report does not discuss COG planning beyond its direct relationship
to COOP planning.  For a more comprehensive analysis of COG, see CRS Report
RS21089, Continuity of Government: Current Federal Arrangements and the Future.
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5Trent Lott, Senate Majority Leader, J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House, Thomas A.
Daschle, Senate Minority Leader, Richard A. Gephardt, House Minority Leader.  September
6, 2000.  “Directive to the United States Capitol Police Board.”
6The Capitol Police Board is comprised of the Sergeants at Arms of the House and Senate
and the Architect of the Capitol.
Recent Activities and Challenges
Most, if not all, government institutions have had plans to restore operations or
continue operations in the face of an emergency.  During the Cold War, Congress
itself established a secret, remote meeting site several hours removed from
Washington, DC, where it might reconvene and resume its constitutional
responsibilities in the event of a nuclear attack.  Also, over the last 20 years,
Congress has worked to incorporate disaster recovery planning into its infrastructure
and software upgrades.
COOP Planning Prior to September 11
Current congressional COOP planning began pursuant to a joint bipartisan
leadership directive5 issued on September 6, 2000, directing the Capitol Police
Board6 to “develop and manage” a “comprehensive Legislative Branch emergency
preparedness plan.”  To facilitate this effort, the board was to work “with the
Attending Physician and the Chief, US Capitol Police, and in coordination with the
Officers of the Senate and House” to develop “an integrated architecture which will
address all hazards which could impede the continuity of essential Legislative Branch
functions.”  According to the directive, this integrated architecture is to include “at
a minimum, emergency preparations, response, mitigation and stabilization activities,
and recovery operations.”
Congressional COOP planning has been developed from the bottom up,
beginning with the identification of critical operational infrastructure and resources,
and creating plans to maintain those capabilities in the event of a wide range of
unforseen circumstances.  Individual COOP plans are activated by specific events
that interrupt routine congressional operations, and focus on restarting those
operations.  The explicit goal of COOP planning is to ensure that congressional
operations can be performed under any circumstances.  The activation of a COOP
plan by one or more offices in Congress is law enforcement sensitive, and is based
on ongoing threat level assessment and the discretion of relevant officials.  Because
there is more than one way to interrupt congressional activity, both House and Senate
planners are developing a variety of contingency plans to respond to a range of
potential operational interruptions.  By design, COOP plans are meant to be living
documents, revised regularly on the basis of emerging issues and needs assessments.
A component of this revision process includes congressional staff education and
training to execute their responsibilities under their COOP plans.
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7John Lancaster and Helen Dewar, “Outraged Lawmakers Vow to Keep Hill Going; Briefly
Evacuated, Congress Returns To Show Resolve,” The Washington Post, Sept. 12, 2001, p.
A21; and Lauren W. Whittington and Mark Preston, “Sorrow and Defiance:  Security
Review Planned,” Roll Call, Sept. 13, 2001, p. 1.
8“Issues Over Funds Control Stalls $40 Billion Bill,” CNN.com, Sept. 14, 2001,
[http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/13/congress.terrorism/].
9Michael Gerber, “Anthrax Found in Kennedy, Dodd Offices,” The Hill, Nov. 21, 2001,
[http://www.hillnews.com/112101/anthrax.shtm];  “U.S. House Offices to Reopen After
Anthrax Scare,” Reuters, Nov. 5, 2001, [http://sg.tech.yahoo.com/reuters/asia-70270.html].
Impact of September 11 and Anthrax Incidents
Comprehensive COOP planning was already underway when, in the fall of
2001, terrorists attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and later several
congressional office buildings were closed due to anthrax contamination.  Those
events added a sense of urgency to the planning process begun a year earlier.
On September 11, 2001, following reports of the Capitol being a potential next
target, some units of the Senate officers’ staffs activated their COOP plans, and COG
plans were activated in the House and Senate.  The leadership of  both chambers was
moved to an undisclosed, secure location for briefings.7  Despite the evacuation of
all congressional buildings, including the Capitol, congressional offices, and the
Library of Congress, the events of September 11 did not cause any lasting
interruption of essential congressional operations.  In some cases, Members and staff
were able to return to their offices and resume activity later in the day, and both
chambers were back in session on September 12.8
In October 2001, concerns regarding anthrax contamination of congressional
buildings resulted in the closure of offices, and the postponement of hearings in both
the Senate and the House of Representatives, as well as a temporary recess of the
House of Representatives.  On Monday, October 15, an anthrax-contaminated letter
was opened in Senator Thomas Daschle’s office, exposing more than two dozen
people to the bacteria.  The following day, the southeast corner of the Hart Senate
Office building, including the offices of 12 Senators, was closed to limit further
exposure and spread of the powdery substance.  On Wednesday, October 17, Speaker
Dennis Hastert announced a 5-day recess while House buildings were tested for
anthrax contamination.  Also that day, Senate Majority Leader Daschle announced
the closure of all Senate office buildings to facilitate testing, but the Senate remained
in session as originally scheduled.
On Monday, October 22, the Capitol building was reopened, and both the House
and the Senate returned to session on Tuesday, October 23.  On October 24, the
Russell Senate Office Building was reopened, followed by the reopening of the
Cannon and Rayburn House Office Buildings on October 25.  The Dirksen Senate
Office Building was reopened on Friday, October 26.  On Monday, November 5, the
Longworth House Office Building was reopened, with the exception of three Member
offices where trace amounts of anthrax were detected.  These offices remained closed
while environmental remediation to remove the anthrax spores took place.9  Portions
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10Michael Gerber, “Anthrax Found in Kennedy, Dodd Offices,” The Hill, Nov. 21, 2001,
[http://www.hillnews.com/112101/anthrax.shtm];  Guy Taylor, “District Sees Threat of
Anthrax Waning,” Washington Times, Nov. 7, 2001, p. A3.
11See the House Advisory Information Page for the most recent information regarding the
status of House buildings [http://www.house.gov/].
12Helen Dewar, “Senate Reclaims Russell Bldg.; Section of Hart Tests Positive,”  The
Washington Post, Oct. 25, 2001, p. A29.;  “Hart Fumigation Appears Successful,” The
Washington Post, Jan. 2, 2002, p. A2;  Spencer S. Hsu, “Hart Reopening Delayed After
Discovery in Ceiling,” The Washington Post, January 18, 2001, A1; Spencer S. Hsu, “‘It’s
Good to Be Back’: Senators Return to Hart; Offices Reopen After 96-Day Anthrax
Quarantine,” The Washington Post, Jan. 23, 2002, p. A1.
13Michael Gerber, “Anthrax Found in Kennedy, Dodd Offices,” The Hill, Nov. 21, 2001, p.
1, and [http://www.hillnews.com/112101/anthrax.shtm].
14Tanya N. Ballard, “In Anthrax Aftermath, GAO Turns to Telecommuting,” Government
Executive Magazine, Nov. 1, 2001,
 [http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1101/110011t1.htm].
15Susan Crabtree, “Ft. McNair Ready for House Action,” Roll Call, Nov. 1, 2001, p.1.
16William Matthews, “E-Mail Keeps Lawmakers in Touch,” Federal Computer Week, Oct.
29, 2001, p. 12; Betsy Rothstein, “Anthrax Crisis Makes Members Displaced Persons,” The
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of the Ford House Office Building were reopened on Tuesday, November 6.10 Offices
on the south side of the first floor of the Ford House Office Building, which had
remained closed for environmental remediation, were reopened on January 22, 2002.
The basement mail room of the Ford House Office Building has been remediated but
not reoccupied.11  The Hart Senate Office Building, which houses 50 Member offices,
remained closed from October 17, 2001 to January 22, 2002.12 
The Russell and Dirksen Senate Office Buildings were briefly closed again on
Saturday, November 17, following the discovery of an anthrax-laced letter addressed
to Senator Patrick Leahy.  Although the Leahy letter was recovered from one of the
280 barrels of congressional mail being held and examined by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), officials were unsure where in the delivery process the letter had
been intercepted.  The two Senate office buildings were reopened Monday,
November 19.13
In addition, many Members of Congress and staff had to relocate to alternate
facilities while House office buildings were closed.  The General Accounting Office
(GAO) provided work facilities, equipment, and supplies for all 440 House Members
and two staffers per Member of Congress, as well as for more than 20 House
committees.14  Preliminary COOP plans were activated when House officers prepared
a temporary alternate facility for floor operations at Fort McNair in the southwest
quadrant of Washington, DC.  However, the plan was not implemented due to the
reopening of the Capitol.15
Some Senators with Capitol offices worked out of them.  Other Senators moved
their office operations to nearby townhouses, apartments, state offices, or even cars
parked in front of the Capitol.16  Some Senators with offices in the Russell and
CRS-6
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Hill, Oct. 31, 2001, [http://www.hillnews.com/103101/displaced.htm].
17Helen Dewar, “Senate Reclaims Russell Bldg.; Section of Hart Tests Positive,”  The
Washington Post, Oct. 25, 2001, p. A29.
18Peter Nicholas, “Anthrax Closures Squeeze the Senate,” The Philadelphia Inquirer,
November 20, 2001, p. A01;  Lauren W. Whittington and Mark Preston, “EPA Hedges on
Hart,” Roll Call, Nov. 29, 2001, p. 1.
19Mail delivery throughout Capitol Hill immediately ceased following the discovery of the
anthrax-laced letter in Senator Daschle’s office.  The distribution of surface mail to
Congress, which is now irradiated before delivery, resumed in late Nov.  However, the
irradiation process can delay delivery by approximately one week.  Jason Miller, “With Mail
Safety Still Iffy, Hill Upgrades E-mail,” Government Computer News, Jan. 7, 2002, p. 14;
Nick Anderson, “Congress Will Get Mail Again,” Los Angeles Times, Nov. 28, 2001,
[http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-112801mail.story].  
20This section is based on discussion with staff in House Information Resources (HIR), and
other sources, as noted.
21The House legislative information management system contains the metadata(or data about
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Dirksen buildings offered to share space with colleagues locked out of the Hart
building.17  In addition, Senate staffers were relocated to first aid stations, mail
rooms, and the offices of the Senate Chaplain, as well as space in the Postal Square
facility.18  Some staff worked from home, or moved to nearby state offices as well.
Although alternate office accommodations were in place, office computer and
hard copy files in the closed offices were, in many cases, at least temporarily
inaccessible.  Members of Congress and their staff adapted quickly to a changing
environment and improvised to ensure that the business of Congress continued.
However, the extended nature of the problems with the Hart Senate Office Building,
and the disruptions of mail delivery,19 highlighted the necessity of ongoing
contingency planning in the event of a larger scale incident involving congressional
facilities.
House COOP Planning20
In the House of Representatives, contingency planning is far from a new
concept.  Disaster recovery planning by House Information Resources (HIR) has
evolved with advances in technology, equipment, and information resources over the
last 20 years.  At various times, disaster recovery planning has been incorporated into
infrastructure and software upgrades deployed in response to emerging events, such
as Year 2000 (Y2K) planning, a series of computer virus incursions, and the
September 11 attacks.
At present, there is a range of backup strategies for maintaining critical House
legislative and administrative information systems maintained by HIR.  These
include workflow and enterprise systems, personnel and payroll operations, House
Web site content, and the House legislative information management system
(LIMS).21  Responsibility for securing and backing up committee and Member hard
CRS-7
21(...continued)
data that describe how, when, and by whom a particular set of data was collected, and how
the data are formatted) generated by the legislative operations of the House.  It is the House
source for portions of the Legislative Information System (LIS) [http:///www.congress.gov]
and Thomas, the public database of congressional information housed in the Library of
Congress and available at [http://thomas.loc.gov].
22Bob Ney, chairman, Committee on House Administration, and Steny Hoyer, ranking
member, All Member Offices to Receive Blackberries (sic), Dear Colleague Letter,
September 21, 2001; and Bob Ney, chairman, Committee on House Administration and
Steny Hoyer, ranking member, BlackBerry Pager Update, Dear Colleague Letter, Oct. 16,
2000.  [http://www.house.gov/cha/publications/DC_s/dc_s.html].  
23This section is based on discussions with staff in the Office of the Secretary of the Senate
and the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate, and other sources, as noted.
copy office information and computer data, including e-mail and office Web sites,
resides in each office.  Among information technology professionals, the need for
contingency planning for the preservation of enterprise information is an industry
standard.  In Member and committee offices, the sensitive nature of the information
suggests that data backup and recovery strategies will need to strike a balance
between control of the information and its relationship to a comprehensive House-
wide data recovery plan.
In other matters of COOP planning, the House of Representatives continues to
consider options for relocating floor activities in the event that Capitol facilities are
unavailable.  Member communications have been upgraded, with the Committee on
House Administration issuing a BlackBerry, a wireless personal digital assistant, to
each Representative.  The purpose of the device is to communicate critical
information to Members when other modes of communication may be inoperative.22
Other COOP issues, including planning for the relocation of House committee
and Member office activities, as well as the development of enhanced capabilities
offered by secure offsite backup and retrieval of critical data, are under consideration
by House officers.
Senate COOP Planning23
In response to the joint bipartisan leadership directive, and guidance from the
Senate Sergeant at Arms, the Senate’s initial COOP plan was completed in the spring
of 2001, with implementation of the plan constituted in three phases.  The first phase
involved the relocation of the Senate chamber and support staff needed to carry out
floor business.  The second phase focused on maintaining the operations of Senate
officers, including the operational and technical infrastructure of the Secretary of the
Senate and Sergeant at Arms.  The final phase involved ensuring the continued
operation of Member and committee offices, as well as support entities, such as the
Legislative Counsel, and the Senate contingent of the Capitol Police.  When fully
deployed, the Senate COOP plan will incorporate and integrate individual
contingency plans for each Senator, committee, and administrative office.  Under a
system of distributed decision making, each Senator or committee chair will have
discretion to activate his or her office COOP plan as events warrant.  Each office will
CRS-8
24Ed Henry and Paul Kane, “BlackBerry, Anyone?,” Roll Call Daily, Nov. 27, 2001, at
[http://www.rollcalldaily.com/rollcalldaily/1_53/hoh/320-1.html].
25A variety of backup methods exist.  One common and relatively inexpensive method for
backing up data is the use of recordable compact discs (CD-R).
have an office emergency coordinator (OEC) responsible for developing and
maintaining the plan.  The OEC will then be charged with implementing the plan.
Several units of the Secretary’s office operated under their COOP plans during
the Senate anthrax incident. Some offices would worked under contingency plans for
a few days during the incident while others’ plans were in effect for the duration of
the Hart Building closure.  Two such offices were the Senate disbursing office, which
handles payroll operations, and the stationery office, which distributes office
supplies.  The offices operated from other locations while the building was
unavailable.  Despite the relocation, all Senate staff were paid without interruption,
and office supplies were available throughout the Senate during the 3 months the
building was closed.
Plans for the relocation of the Senate chamber were completed in 2002, and the
Senate Sergeant at Arms and Secretary of the Senate developed a range of plans for
maintaining congressional information and operations. Phase three implementation,
in which leadership, committee, and Member offices were trained to develop their
own COOP plans has also been completed.  Under the direction of the Committee on
Rules and Administration, the Sergeant at Arms and Secretary of the Senate trained
leadership, committee, and Member offices to write and complete COOP plans
during the spring and summer of 2002.  COOP plans are dynamic, and must be
reflect current operational conditions.  To ensure that individual office COOP plans
remain current, future Senate COOP planning will include annual awareness training
for committee and officer staffs.  It is also anticipated that a review of committee
COOP plans by the Committee on Rules and Administration will be a part of the
committee budget process in the 108th Congress.  Finally, COOP plan development
training will be integrated into training for newly elected Senators and their staffs at
the beginning of the 108th Congress.
In addition to the formal COOP planning process, the Senate has issued
BlackBerry personal digital assistants to every Senator.24  Information technology
managers in the Sergeant at Arms office have developed extensive systems for
safeguarding data and electronic records, and maintain remote storage of payroll,
personnel, and purchasing information through an outside vendor.  Responsibility for
securing and backing up committee and Member hard copy office information and
computer data,25 including e-mail and office Web sites, resides in individual offices;
the Sergeant at Arms provides data backup and recovery services upon request.
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26Remote voting can include a range of technology systems that might facilitate voting by
Members who are not physically present on the House or Senate floor.  The rules of both
chambers assume that Members will be present, and do not allow remote voting.
Conversely, Senate rules authorize committees to adopt rules for proxy voting, a paper based
form of remote voting.
27See [http://www.greenbrier.com/docs/hotel_activities.html].
28Ted Gup, “The Ultimate Congressional Hideaway,” The Washington Post Magazine, May
31, 1992, p. 11.
Current Issues and Proposals
As Congress moves forward with its COOP planning, a number of procedural,
logistical, and technical issues arise.  Some of these include the use of remote
voting26, information security, the compatibility between individual Member,
committee, and other congressional COOP plans, and replicating traditional activities
in alternative environments.  Although some of these issues can be addressed by
thorough planning and testing by professional staff, others, such as the possibility of
remote voting, could require legislative or even constitutional responses. 
Relocating Legislative Activities
Since the establishment of the District of Columbia as the national capital,
Congress has been unable to use the Capitol only once.  During the War of 1812,
British troops burned the Capitol, forcing Congress to meet elsewhere in
Washington, DC, for 5 years.  In response to the recent evacuations and closures of
the Capitol and House and Senate office buildings, both chambers made alternative
arrangements to conduct congressional business.  Some staff were able to
communicate by wireless devices and e-mail systems, while others met in alternative
office space or their homes.  Although some Members of Congress met together
informally, neither chamber met in session outside the Capitol.
During the Cold War, Congress established a remote meeting site under The
Greenbrier resort in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia.27  The facility was
reportedly established to assist Congress to carry out its activities away from
Washington, DC in the event of nuclear attack. The site was equipped with facilities
for House of Representatives and Senate floor activities, and a large hall to
accommodate joint meetings.28  In the absence of a national attack, this facility was
never used, and has since been opened to the public for tours.  At this time there are
no current public proposals for the establishment of a similar facility.
The current details of physically relocating Congress are not publicly available.
Congress has taken steps to authorize the relocation of floor activities, and some
proposals have been put forth regarding potential facilities for Congress to use in an
emergency.  Under the rules of each chamber, House and Senate committee activity
beyond Washington, DC, is already permissible.
Floor activity.  Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution prohibits either
chamber from meeting in “… any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall
CRS-10
29In the House, “place” has been interpreted to mean the seat of government.  See U.S.
Congress, House, Constitution, Jefferson’s Manual and Rules of the House of
Representatives of the United States, 107th Congress, H. Doc. 106-320 106th Congress, 2nd
session, compiled by Charles W. Johnson, Parliamentarian.  (Washington: GPO, 2001), pp.
34-35.  By statute, the seat of government is anywhere within the boundaries of Washington,
DC.  See 4 U.S.C. 71.
30Amy Keller, “E-Congress: Possible? Yes. Likely? No.” Roll Call, Nov. 5, 2001, p. A1.
31Under meetings of committees, Riddick’s Senate Procedure also states that each Senate
standing committee or their subcommittees “... is authorized to hold hearings, to sit and act
at such times and places during the sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the
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be sitting” without the consent of the other chamber.29  There appears to be no
constitutional bar, however, to the House and Senate adopting a resolution that
contingently approves possible meetings of either chamber outside the Capitol in
advance of any such meetings themselves.  In the aftermath of the September 11
attacks and anthrax interruptions, Congress modified its adjournment resolutions to
allow either chamber to reconvene at a place and time designated by the Speaker of
the House and the Majority Leader of the Senate, whenever they determine the public
interest shall warrant it.  In making this decision, the Speaker and Majority Leader
typically consult with the Minority Leaders of the House and Senate.
Some have suggested that, in the event of an interruption that renders Capitol
Hill facilities unusable, Congress move to the legislative buildings of nearby state
governments or other government facilities and resume operations from those
locations.30  Administrative questions COOP planners and policymakers may
consider when reviewing the relocation of floor activities include, for example, what
facilities are available in other locations for Members, staff and chamber officers,
such as the parliamentarians, security officers, and clerks.  What level of physical
security exists in these facilities?  If Congress chose to move to state legislative
facilities, what arrangements would be necessary if the state legislature needs to hold
its own legislative sessions?  Some may ask whether moving Congress as a whole to
another location improves security, or merely relocates a terrorist target.  In practical
terms, what logistical and technical issues must be addressed so that relocated floor
activity can be supported at an alternative site, and within an accelerated time-frame?
How would Members of Congress and staff be informed to meet at the alternative
site?  How would Members of Congress and staff be transported to the alternative
site?  What if Members of Congress were unable to get to the alternative site due to
travel restrictions or interruptions?  Finally, what advance arrangements would need
to be made between Congress and the state legislatures that may host them?
Committees.  Congressional committees hold meetings and hearings on a
range of public policy issues and legislative initiatives.  House Rule XI, 2 (m), states
in part that a committee is authorized “... to sit and act at such times and places within
the United States, whether the House is in session, has recessed, or has adjourned,
and to hold such hearings as it considers necessary ....”  Similarly, Senate Rule
XXVI, 1, states that a committee “... is authorized to hold such hearings, to sit and
act at such times and places during the sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of
the Senate ...” as it sees fit.31  Funding for committee travel and guidelines on other
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31(...continued)
Senate...”  Floyd M. Riddick and Alan S. Frumin, Riddick’s Senate Procedure: Precedents
and Practices, S. Doc. 101-28 (Washington: GPO, 1992), p. 404.  Discussion with the
House parliamentarian indicates that the chair in the House has never been called upon to
rule on the matter of House committees holding meetings beyond Washington, DC.
32In the House, regulations printed in the House Administration Committee’s Congressional
Handbook cover matters specific to field hearings. The handbook is available from the
committee and can be viewed online at [http://www.house.gov/cha/cmtehdbkcover.html].
In the Senate, committee travel in general is governed by regulations compiled in the U.S.
Senate Handbook (Chapter 11, Appendix D of the 1996 edition). Print and online versions
of the handbook are available - to Senate offices only - from the Senate Committee on Rules
and Administration.
33For the full text of the press release, see
 [http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ri02_langevin/pr120601continuity.html].
34Amy Keller, “E-Congress: Possible? Yes. Likely? No.” Roll Call, Nov. 5, 2001, p. A1;
J.H. Snider, “Planning for the Worst,” Federal Computer Week, Oct. 15, 2001, p. 36;  Noah
(continued...)
administrative matters involved in hearings away from the Capitol are already
established by regulations issued by the House Administration Committee and the
Senate Rules and Administration Committee.32
Electronic Sessions and Legislation in the 107th Congress
The events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent anthrax incidents have
highlighted some of the potential vulnerabilities of the centralized assembly of the
nation’s lawmakers, prompting some observers to suggest creating a virtual or
electronic Congress (e-Congress).  In the 107th Congress (2001-2002) a proposal
(H.R. 3481) was been introduced to require the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) to investigate the feasibility and costs of implementing a
computer system for remote voting and communication for Congress to ensure
business continuity for congressional operations.  The Committee on House
Administration held hearings on e-Congress initiatives and other issues surrounding
the continuity of congressional operations on May 1, 2002. A second measure (H.R.
5007) was introduced, directing the Comptroller General to enter into arrangements
with the National Academy of Science and the Librarian of Congress to examine the
feasibility and costs, and the constitutional and procedural issues associated with the
creation of an emergency electronic communication system for Congress,
respectively.  In a press release announcing his intention to introduce the H.R. 3481,
Representative James Langevin, who sponsored both measures, cited the importance
of maintaining “the effective operation of the nation’s highest lawmaking body,” as
well as the need to “learn from our mistakes and take the necessary steps to prepare
for future threats to ensure that government can continue to conduct its business
effectively.”33
Although it is unclear exactly how an e-Congress would be constituted and
operated, some observers have offered some broad suggestions involving the
establishment of a Web site that Members could access from anywhere in the country
(and perhaps the world).34  Proponents envision such a Web site would enable
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34(...continued)
Shachtman, “Can Congress Convene Online?” Wired News, Oct. 25, 2001,
[http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,47841,00.html].
35See James Schultz, “New Urgency for Disaster Recovery Planning,” Washington
Technology, Oct. 8, 2001, pp. 18-20.
36Despite many predictions regarding the advent of the so-called paperless office, the
blizzard of paper that accompanied the dust and debris with the collapse of the World Trade
Center towers on Sept. 11, 2001 suggests many organizations are still heavily dependent on
their physical documents.  One company that did have a comprehensive digital imaging
system in place before Sept. 11 was Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield.  Developed over the
past 10 years, starting with claims forms, the insurance carrier’s optical storage system
captures almost all of its paper documents.  As a result, the company lost only about 2 days’
worth of paper mail.  See Stan Gibson, “Rethinking Storage,” eWeek, Oct. 15, 2001, p. 1.
37See Lisa Yeo, “SOHO Security Best Practices,” at
 [http://www.sans.org/infosecFAQ/homeoffice/SOHO.htm].
Members to carry out activities normally done on the chambers’ floors or in
committees.   The possibility of convening an e-Congress raises a number of
procedural, technical, and resource questions, some of which have not yet been
addressed.  A more complete discussion of issues raised by the development of an
electronic Congress can be found in CRS Report RS21140, Electronic Congress:
Proposals and Issues.
Member Office Information Security
Continuity planners suggest that a critical element of COOP planning is to plan
ahead and to develop a clear understanding of what materials and information are
most crucial to continuing operations if regular facilities are not available.35  A
component in this planning is the preservation of critical information maintained in
computer systems.
Congressional offices that wish to retain control over their own data may prefer
to develop their own plans for backup and subsequent recovery of critical
information recorded on paper and electronic media.  Information security
professionals recommend making a regular, global backup of system files and data,
and more frequent (daily) backups of new and recently changed files. This might
include systematic scanning and retention of electronic images of irreplaceable paper
documents.36  Backup copies then need to be stored in a secure location other than
the office where the original files are located.  For example, Member Capitol Hill
offices could store backup copies in state or district offices, and vice versa.
Information security professionals also recommend additional actions such as
maintaining a series of regularly updated copies, so that not all office data are lost in
the event that a particular backup copy is corrupted, or otherwise compromised by
a virus, defective media, or other cause.37 
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38A denial-of-service attack is an attempt to crash a network or make a Web site inaccessible
by flooding it with useless traffic.
39For an overview of potential electronic incursions, see Dorothy E. Denning, “Activism,
Hacktivism, and Cyberterrorism:  The Internet as a Tool for Influencing Foreign Policy,”
at [http://www.terrorism.com/documents/denning-infoterrorism.html].
40This glossary was excerpted from the Continuity of Operations Plan 2002 template used
for training and plan development purposes by the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate.   
Additional Considerations
As COOP projects move forward, planners may also continue to consider
responses to the possibility of interruptions affecting critical operating systems and
data such as communications, the Legislative Information System (LIS), and
individual Member computer resources.  An electronic interruption or cyber attack
could manifest itself through the spread of computer viruses or worms.  It could also
take the form of hackers gaining access to congressional computer systems or denial-
of-service (DoS) attacks on congressional Web servers.38  Similarly, another
possibility is an attack, physical or electronic, or other interruption to a major
telecommunications switching station in the Washington, DC, area, which could
significantly affect the Congress’s ability to communicate both internally and
externally.  Some of these vulnerabilities are being addressed through the
implementation of wireless devices, such as the BlackBerry.39
Selected Glossary of COOP-Related Terms40
Action Officer - designated individual with the responsibility to ensure that all
actions prescribed to his/her respective department/office are executed according to
the policies and procedures of the COOP.
After-Action Report (AAR) - a narrative report that presents issues found during
an incident and recommendations on how those issues can be resolved.
Alternate Database/Records Access - the safekeeping of vital resources, facilities,
and records, and the ability to access such resources in the event that the COOP plan
is put into effect.
Alternate Facilities - an alternate work site that provides the capability to perform
minimum essential department or office functions until normal operations can be
resumed.
Art and Other Valuables - Objects of art, including photographs, paintings,
lithographs, statuary, rugs, tapestries, books and similar items that are on loan from
an individual or institution or are personal property of the Senator or staff.
Business Continuity - the sum of an organization’s business.  It includes all of the
core business functions, which define the organization.  A business continuity plan
includes risk mitigation strategy, contingencies, and recovery, to ensure the
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organization’s core business processes continue despite disruptions to infrastructure
or support systems.
Business function - a group of logically related tasks that are performed together to
accomplish an objective.  
Business priority -  is derived by the combination of risk assessment and impact.
The priority can help the organization determine areas of emphasis and where
resources will be employed when it becomes obvious not all risks can be mitigated.
Business Resumption Team - a team comprising application system expertise and
business analysts.  This is a quick action team that will pinpoint a problem and be
equipped/trained to correct the problem and restore operations, at least minimally.
Cold Site - a relocation site that is reserved for emergency use, but which requires
the installation of equipment, etc., before it can support operation.
Continuity of Government (COG) - applies to the measures taken by the
government to continue to perform required functions during and after a severe
emergency.  COG is a coordinated effort within each branch of the government to
continue its minimum essential responsibilities in a catastrophic emergency.
Continuity of Operations (COOP) - an internal effort within individual components
of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government to assure the
capability exists to continue essential component functions across a wide range of
potential emergencies, including localized acts of nature, accidents, and technological
or attack-related emergencies.
Emergency - a sudden, usually unexpected event that does or could do harm to
people, resources, property, or the environment.  Emergencies can range from
localized events that affect a single office in a building, to human, natural or
technological events that damage, or threaten to damage, local operations.  An
emergency could cause the temporary evacuation of personnel or the permanent
displacement of personnel and equipment from the site to a new operating location.
Emergency Personnel - any person whose presence on-site is deemed necessary in
a situation or an occurrence of a serious nature, which develops suddenly and
unexpectedly, and demands immediate action.
Essential Functions - those functions, stated or implied, that are required by the
Leadership to be performed by the SAA, to provide vital services, maintain the safety
and well being of the Senate community and general populace, and continue to fulfill
the constitutional obligations of the Senate.
Essential Operations - those operations, stated or implied, that are required by the
Leadership to be performed by the SAA.
Essential Positions - those positions, stated or implied, that are required to be filled
by the SAA or other positions deemed essential by the Senate Leadership. 
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Fly-Away Kit - an easily transported set of materials, technology, and vital records
that will be required to establish and maintain minimum essential operations.
Hot Site - a relocation site available for immediate occupancy that is equipped to
permit rapid resumption of essential functions.
Internet - worldwide interconnection of computers, typically interconnected using
the TCP/IP protocol.  Access to the Internet is normally through service providers
and available to the general public.  
Interoperable Communications - alternate communications that provide the
capability to perform minimum essential department or office functions until normal
operations can be resumed.
Intranet - a privately operated internal computer network that is used to publish
information, and implement human resource or other business applications within a
company or organization. Intranets normally provide services to staff and other
individuals within a company or organization.
Logistics Team - a working group responsible for coordinating the activities
associated with relocation planning and deployment of essential operations and
positions during a COOP event.
Management Plan - an operational guide that ensures the implementation,
maintenance, and continued viability of the COOP.
Office Emergency Coordinator (OEC) - Individual responsible for implementing
the office or committee COOP plan during an emergency.
Plan Maintenance - steps taken to ensure the COOP plan is reviewed annually and
updated whenever major changes occur.
Primary Facility - the site of normal, day-to-day operations; the location where an
employee usually goes to work.
Rights and Interest Records - records required for the preservation of the rights and
interests of individual citizens and the government.  These records include proof of
ownership, financial interests, and legal proceedings and decisions.  Rights and
interest records are not generally believed to be needed during an emergency.
Relocation Site - the site where all or designated employees will report for work if
required to move from the primary facility.
Situation Report (SITREP) - a written, formatted report that provides a picture of
the response activities during a designated reporting period.
Special Reconstitution Teams - a group of several individuals who together may be
assigned specific responsibilities to manage and support the SAA’s requirements
during the initial phase of a COOP event.  Examples of these teams are: Logistics,
Damage Assessment, and Employee Tracking.
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Training and Exercise - this activity includes: (1) efforts to educate/advise
designated staff on COOP responsibilities, and on the existing plans; and (2) tests to
demonstrate the viability and interoperability of all plans supporting COOP
requirement.
U.S.P.S. - United States Postal Service.
Vital Records and Systems - records necessary to maintain the continuity of
operations during an emergency, to recover full operations following an emergency,
and to protect the legal rights and interests of citizens and the government.
Working Documents - documents that enable or facilitate office operations but are
not legally required for departmental operations.
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